MBIA and Ambac have probably just passed away

MBIA has been downgraded by Moody’s all the way to A2. Ambac is AA3. That makes their insurance useless, and in all probability that means they are now nothing more than vehicles for paying off the claims of their existing contracts. The Muni issuers will terminate their contracts, the underlying credits are already better than these two companies ratings. If they don’t, it means their situation has likely worsened. That leaves them with only the highest risk Muni bonds in their portfolio remaining.

The other part of their business is already pretty much dead. As long as the number of defaults doesn’t increase they will probably have enough money to pay off the claims for expected losses on their credit default swaps. The problem? Expected losses are rising. Most prominently on various mortgage backed securities.

Likely outcome- These two go under eventually, a number of mortgage backed securities and other fixed income securities will eventually go under without MBIA and Ambac being able to pay the claims, those who purchased the insurance will be pressured and some may default themselves down the road. This is not cataclysmic. This is a big issue and will make things worse.

Suggested readings:The end of MBIA and Ambac?, Downgrades Come Easy, Upgrades Come Hard, Upgrades to AAA? — Forget It., On the MBIA, Ambac Downgrades; Regulatory Comments on MBIA, MBIA Downgrade Increases Collateral Requirements; Clarification on CDS Acceleration in Insolvency/Custodianship, MBIA: Moody’s Twists the Knife

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Housing Incoherence

From the New York Times:

Earlier this year, Mr. Bush derided a modest plan to provide $4 billion to states and localities to buy foreclosed properties, saying that buying up empty homes helps only “the lenders or the speculators.” Actually, it protects entire neighborhoods and local economies from the effects of foreclosures by preventing a greater buildup of unsold homes and a further drop in prices.

This site is not about politics, but before I discuss this some disclosure is necessary. I am a fan of free markets. I do not however belong to that group of fans who believes that the market left to its own devices comes up with an optimal outcome (however one might define optimal.) There are a number of reasons to favor free markets, that isn’t one of them.

Still, one reason to favor markets, and all the pain and inequity they come with, is that even if one believes that well thought out policies could cure whatever evils (however one wishes to define them) that the market (or our world in general) afflicts us with, it is highly unlikely that we will ever get such policies. This kind of solution is exhibit 10,549 of that truth.

I only address the politics of this, because as investors we are forced to analyze things which will undoubtedly rub some peoples political beliefs the wrong way, and this is one place where I cannot avoid it, no matter how much I might wish to do so.

The absurdities

So what exactly have our leaders in Washington, and pundits on the board of the Times, come up with?

First let us deal with the absurd aspects of this plan. The government buys up a bunch of foreclosed properties that are theoretically driving down the prices of other homes. Uh, does anyone else see the big gaping hole in this logic? After the government buys them, they are still abandoned! Unless the government just takes them off the market indefinitely (thus restricting supply) rather than sell them, how does that solve the problem of excess inventory?

What it does do is allow the lenders to get a price higher than they would if the homes had to sell at a price that people could actually afford. So, bankers and other lenders get bailed out, taxpayers have a bunch of homes they have to sell at prices lower than they paid for them. Personally, I would rather have out taxes not be used to bail out lenders.

One problem homeowners are facing is abandoned homes becoming a drag due to lack of maintenance. Will the government keep all these homes up? As little faith as I have in the lenders, the profit motive will likely make them better stewards (if only marginally, given the enormity of the issue) than the state.

A Little Reality

Most important, is that we investors need to avoid falling for simple sounding solutions that will in the end not help that much. The ultimate problem with housing is not greedy lenders (greed is nothing new) or deadbeats, government policies (a personal favorite post of mine) or incompetent regulators (though all had their role in getting us to this point.) It is that housing prices are too high.

For reasons stated above this particular solution is not going to help keep prices high, but what if they could? Is that really good? Housing is extremely unaffordable in many markets. Prices will come down. Is dragging that out the best answer? I find that in isolation a dubious, and at best a marginal, good. Given the cost, in tax dollars, inflation, misallocation of resources and the moral hazard of lenders and borrowers believing that risk can be taken with some portion of it underwritten by the state, the benefits should have to be huge. As investors we should be skeptical that the end result will be good for the rest of the economy.

The same problem comes even with trying to keep interest rates low. Let us assume that these various measures, combined with low interest rates, slows, or even temporarily halts, the decline in housing prices.

Much as with claims about the “fed model” there is the belief that lower interest rates will allow people to afford a home that they could not a higher rate, ( also that lower prices will result in demand curves that shift) etc. All of these arguments miss a key point. Interest rates change. A stock price that is “justified” by todays interest rate, says nothing about whether it will be similarly “justified” in the future. Nor does a high price being “justified” by low current interest rates mean you will get a satisfactory return. It just means it will be better (actually that isn’t a given either) than a bond yielding 3% (or whatever the low rate happens to be.)

So it is with housing. Absent a speculative bubble such as we just went through in housing, low interest rates might encourage people back into the market. It might halt the slide in housing prices from going back to an economically reasonable level as fast, or temporarily. However, those buyers will not be selling to people with similarly low rates in the future. In an efficient market (stop giggling Barry and Jeremy) markets would see through temporary low rate periods and price housing at sustainable levels that vary little around interest rates. I suspect in this instance gun shy homeowners will (or even lower.) At the end of the day however it doesn’t matter even if they do not. All that means is that down the road prices will fall when interest rates go up and prospective buyers cannot afford them any longer. The same for being able to “afford” a house at a lower credit score. Prices still have to be affordable for succeeding groups of home buyers. In much of the country they just are not. This not just “gonzo” pundits beating some fantasy bear drum, but yes Jeff, “real” economists such as Martin Feldstein (who has some trenchant comments on the health of the economy and misreading of the GDP data as well)

I’ll tell you what worries me. We saw house prices overshoot by 60% relative to costs of building and relative to rents. And I worry about the possibility that they will keep falling; they will spiral downwards. In the same way that they went much too high, they could go much too low. And if that happens, then we are going to see individuals feeling a lot poorer, cutting back on their spending, defaulting on mortgages, and we’re going to see the holders of those mortgages see their assets, their capital being cut and therefore their ability to make loans being cut.

Incoherence

Bill Gross should know better, but unfortunately he doesn’t seem to realize that after decrying the destructive potential of housing prices rising faster than inflation and incomes, that keeping them from correcting that rise is destructive as well, and unlikely to work.

So let us end with one more political (if non partisan) note. If all these policies could help keep prices up, if other policies suggested are effective as well, what have we done?

Encouraging people to buy houses at prices that were economically too burdensome, and likely to eventually lose value, is what got us into this mess in the first place.

Why is it a virtue for the government to do exactly what we are criticizing mortgage companies, banks and even the fed for encouraging home buyers to do in the past? Isn’t the end result just the same thing if possibly a bit more drawn out? Investors beware.

Update: Dean Baker (another “real” economist) takes up some similar themes:

Have the NYT editorial writers not noticed this bubble or do they think the housing bubble was a good development that the government should try to foster?

The level of incoherence of the housing policy advocated by the NYT is astounding. Why on earth should Congress act to keep house prices above their market level?

House price supports will not work in the long-run. If we keep house prices high, builders will construct more houses and the over-supply will grow even larger. In this way, a house price support program is like a farm price support program, except we have a $20 trillion stock of housing. The market for most farm products is in the tens of billions of dollars annually.

A house price support program will end up costing the government billions and possibly tens of billions of dollars. Is it better for the government to spend this money (most of which will be paid to banks) supporting house prices than to pay for health care, child care or good rental housing?

Furthermore, since house prices will eventually fall to their market clearing levels, will the NYT policy even help moderate income homeowners? They will be paying far more in housing costs for the years they still in their home than they would to rent a comparable unit. This will be diverting money that they may have otherwise used for their kids health care and child care or other necessary expenses. And, since the house price will fall, they will never accumulate any equity.

Jon Henke also smells the whiff of the farm support program.

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$200 OIL!

Goldman’s Murti Says Oil `Likely’ to Reach $150-$200

Do you remember when Murti was derided for making the call that oil was going to have a superspike? I do, and I was one of the skeptics, though only for a brief while.

Crude oil may rise to between $150 and $200 a barrel within two years as growth in supply fails to keep pace with increased demand from developing nations, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. analysts led by Arjun N. Murti said in a report.

New York-based Murti first wrote of a “super spike” in March 2005, when he said oil prices could range between $50 and $105 a barrel through 2009. The price of crude traded in New York averaged $56.71 in 2005, $66.23 in 2006 and $72.36 in 2007. Oil rose to an intraday record $120.93 today on speculation demand will rise during the peak U.S. summer driving season.

No prediction from me, but I can see reasonable arguments for oil going up or down significantly. Longer term though, barring some unforeseen technological breakthrough that can be rapidly deployed, energy costs will stay high. Owning some exposure to energy as a hedge makes sense in any case.

Hat Tip: Barry Ritholtz.

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A “common sense approach for those who believe in active management”

That is All About Alpha’s assessment of 130/30 funds (definition here.) Which seems about right to us.

Few active managers, even if they actually outperform their benchmarks, can overcome the expenses associated with doing so. The reason is not necessarily that they cannot do a good enough job of picking investments that can outperform, but that constrained to only going long they can’t make a big enough bet on what they like, or don’t like, to move the needle sufficiently! Here is a nice examination of this issue.

The Alpha male has several nice posts up on this in addition to the ones above. On appropriate benchmarks:

After launching 130/30 index, S&P says best yardstick is actually a long-only index and Survey of hedge fund professionals: 130/30 “minor discussion within larger context”

The evolution of these vehicles:

The new face of 130/30? and Reality Check: “130/30? and “quant” not synonymous

For a discussion of the actual alpha that theoretically might be received by investors read this post on an interesting study:

130/30 in the 1930s

Most importantly, for those unfortunate enough to have been exposed to Chuck Jaffe’s execrable column on 130/30 strategies (or their brethren) I recommend Media turns hostile: 130/30 now “dubious” “overblown” “faddish” “hype”. The Alpha Male is more generous with Jaffe than I would be, but that is probably a good thing.

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Consumer Spending is Ugly

While spending increased in March by 1.8% over a year ago, adjusted for inflation it was way down. The only reason sales were positive was gasoline, though food sales were positive. Even there, that is mostly due to inflation and rising prices of food and staples.

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Are we in a recession yet?

Personally I think we have been negative since November. Given the large positive number in the third quarter, the barely above break even number in the fourth quarter virtually guarantees that the economy went negative sometime in November and December. However, if we are not, it is highly likely coming. Here is a graphic which should put it in perspective. From Moody’s we get this look at freight (Click to enlarge)

Transportation

That is a pretty stunning collapse. Few things correlate with economic activity more than freight, and for rather obvious reasons.

While I have been very negative on the economy shorter term for some time, I will say I doubt this will be a particularly deep recession. On the other hand, I also expect it to be rather drawn out. Obviously I could easily be wrong on both counts.

I will repeat what I have said over and over, in a probabilistic world we cannot know the future, but we can say that the risks are rather high and we should all consider lowering the amount of risk we face. That means more cash in our savings accounts, more defense in your portfolios (if you are going to take risk, make it risk that doesn’t correlate with US financial markets) and reducing debt.

With both financial markets and housing prices I would be wary. Your situation may differ, but I keep hearing people say things must be attractive at this point. Housing is a much better deal than it was, etc.

That is exactly right, but I suspect that this also likely holds true. It is approximately 4 1/2 hours from Baton Rouge to Shreveport. Alexandria lies halfway between. When my children ask me how far we still have to go, while I undoubtedly have far less distance to go than when I started, I still have just as far to drive as I have already driven.

In many areas of the financial markets and housing things may be less expensive than they were, but they are still way too expensive and there is a lot more bad news coming down the pike.

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House Keeping

I have been busy getting prepared for our yearly investment conference, which we completed last week, and now the implementation phase, but I will try and get back to posting more regularly over the next few days. Please keep checking in. As all the work preparing for, and acting on, our new asset allocation for 2008 is still in progress it will be a slow ramp up, but as that winds down Risk and Return should have a poker bonus 1000www poker regelnpoker lernenonline games poker spielenpoker zum spielenbestes online pokerpoker in internetpoker cardsgioco poker on linepoker tour pctexas holdem poker regoletilt pokervideo poker online gratisgiocare a poker onlineplay poker on line,how to play poker,play pokerhow to play pokersuper pokerplay omaha pokerpoker milanopoker giochi scaricaregioca a poker gratispoker virtualegiochi giochi onlinepoker tour ps2download giochigiochi seven card stud gratispoker games gratiswww super poker comomaha poker in lineagiochare omaha pokerpoker on line bonuspoker sexi gratisgiocare onlineonline poker,play poker online,poker on linepoker regole di giocostrp pokerpoker superstars invitational tournamenttexas holdem calculatemstreap poker on linegiochi flash pokerstrep poker gratisgiochi on line pokercarte giocowww pokergioco carte pokertexas poker on lineomaha poker gratispoker texana onlinepoker download gratistexas holdem rules lot to think and write about.

If 2008 is half as successful for our tactical asset allocation decisions as was 2007, we should have a very nice year indeed. We still feel an absolute return bias is the proper mindset going forward, and represents the best trade off between risk and return.

We will have a review of our outlook going up Monday.

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Today’s Links: Housing Market Update

We should start out with some humor:

A robber in a ski mask blamed the bank for what he was about to do, The Associated Press reported Feb. 22.

“You took my house, now I’m going to take your money!” the assailant hollered. Talk about a reverse mortgage!

The FBI plans to review the bank’s foreclosure records for clues.

The suspect is presumed to be ARM’ed and dangerous.

The New York Times reports that bailing out homeowners is becoming increasingly talked about. This graphic explains why:

Declining equity

Alan Blinder wants the Feds to enter the mortgage business as they did in the great depression. Hat tip: Greg Mankiw

Edmund Andrews worries that Mortgage bailouts could create moral hazard issues. Uh, you think?

Tanta is pretty unimpressed, though she does give us some thoughts on the issues around making mortgage securitization less of a disaster than it has been this time around.

Dean Baker points out that plans to buy up the mortgages does carry some risk. Throw in his lack of conviction that raising the ceilings for the mortgages that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can purchase in areas with high-priced homes will help.

This post on worries about the credit worthiness of Fannie and Freddie shows the markets are pretty unsure about them as well.

Mark Thoma gives his thoughts here and here.

Yves Smith has the most realistic reaction to all these proposals for solving these issues. They probably will not work, expose us to moral hazard, and would be far more expensive than Alan Blinder believes. Many of the solutions look at this as a temporary problem of credit markets and people who couldn’t afford their homes. That is true, but more fundamentally homes need to come down in price. Plans that assume the need to stabilize home prices, or help out borrowers who are over extended, are building in failure. Prices will likely not stabilize, and probably shouldn’t. James Hamilton seems to agree as well:

To the extent that analysis is correct, a “pause” in the foreclosure process will be helpful only if house prices are finished falling. But house prices decline sluggishly in response to market pressure, given the unwillingness of many sellers to acknowledge the magnitude of their capital loss. Even if the number of homes sold were to rebound tomorrow, there would remain a large inventory of unsold homes that will continue to push prices down.

Calculated Risk looks at the merits of the various home price indexes. James Hamilton weighs in on the topic as well.

The National Association of Home Builders remains cautious about the market going forward despite a slight up tick in activity. The fact that permits fell, starts were flat, and for single families at the lowest level since 1991 might have something to do with it (pdf.).

As abandoned homes pile up neighbors in Minneapolis are being urged to “adopt” their neighbors homes .

Barry Ritholtz lets us know about Rotten Neighbor.com .

Some believe this whole mess is part of a fundamental shift in the American landscape, with cites doing better, suburbia declining and taking on some of the characteristics of decaying inner cities. Extreme, but some of it has a ring of truth as urban living becomes more desirable and desired.

But we could be Britain!

Britain’s housing market is a “house of cards” that is set to implode after years of reckless mortgage lending, chronic oversupply of new flats and widespread fraud, a leading analyst said yesterday. (The Times) (via Barry Ritholtz )

Now for a Little discussion of the past

One of the ongoing debates over the last few years has been the economic impact of home equity withdrawal through home equity lines of credit and loans, cash out refinances, etc. How important was it? Was it sustainable?

I think those of us who worried about it can claim that it is now fairly clear it wasn’t sustainable. So let us go down memory lane and look at what was of such concern by the end of 2005:

MEW

Notice the two previous big drops came with pretty large economic downturns. The drops worsened the downturns and the downturns worsened the drops. That seemed pretty obviously something to be concerned about, but we negative Nellie’s were told to pipe down time and again. By this Summer that trend was reversing :

MEW Falling

The problem for the market:

Mortgage debt supporting profits

One would expect to see profit margins coming under pressure, even without the mortgage meltdown. Historically a housing downturn has been bad for the economy, despite claims by some that it would be “contained” and is a small part of the overall economy. Once again, that is without the mortgage and credit market meltdown we are now experiencing:

Housing and jobs

Nevertheless people still argued that Mortgage Equity withdrawal was somehow different than other debt because it was being used on improvements. Well that economic engine has gone into reverse:

ORLANDO, Fla. – Those fancy home fix-ups touted in cable TV shows and home magazines are losing their luster with consumers.

With the shakeout in the housing market, homeowners are worried they won’t get their money back from high-dollar redos.

And lenders are less willing to finance pricey home improvements.

That has caused a decline in nationwide remodeling.

“We saw a downturn in 2007, and 2008 looks every bit as tough for the industry,” said Kermit Baker, a researcher with Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies. “After some almost record-breaking growth, the market has stalled.”

Per capita home remodeling expenses in the region that includes Texas jumped almost 50 percent between 1996 and 2006. But since then, spending for home upgrades has fallen.

In a quarterly comparison, nationwide home remodeling expenditures have fallen about 10 percent since their high in 2006.

Researchers blame the downturn in the overall housing market for dampening the desire for home redos.

“Homeowners have been scaling back on their remodeling plans as the overall market has weakened,” Mr. Baker said.

“Homeowners are concerned that they may be overimproving their homes relative to their neighborhood and prices in the market.”

Studies back up those concerns. Average returns on a home remodeling project have fallen from 82.5 percent in 2003 to 70 percent last year.

With home prices depressed in many neighborhoods, homeowners are especially worried that they won’t get the bucks back they spend on luxury features such as saunas, European cabinetry and imported tile floors.

“There are some signs that the emerging weakness may be greater at the upper end of the market,” Mr. Baker said. “We are seeing more of a return to basics.”

That means less costly improvements and standard maintenance, he said, rather than “some of the sexier kitchen and bath projects.”

Tanta goes back over the argument at length at Calculated Risk, but obviously it has not been sustained. Nor was any where near all the equity withdrawn going to improvements on homes, so we can expect declines across a range of goods and services.

Tellingly, banks and lenders now agree on that fact:

Last year, 34 percent of borrowers said they used their home equity lines to pay off other debt and 29 percent used them for home renovation, according to a survey of lenders by BenchMark Consulting International. Another 31 percent used them to pay for other things, such as medical bills, weddings or vacations.

Paying off other debt in many cases only meant freeing up the ability to run those credit accounts up again. The assumption being that home appreciation would continue so they could do it again, or just plain didn’t have any plan at all. So the banks are now freezing people’s Home Equity Lines of Credit :

Larry F. Pratt, chief executive of First Savings Mortgage in McLean, said most mortgage documents he has seen give lenders wide latitude to suspend or freeze credit lines.

“A layperson would not recognize the language because it’s not that blatant,” Pratt said. “It talks about deterioration of the value of the asset or the value of the collateral. . . . It’s not boilerplate language by any means.”

Across the nation many borrowers are upset. This will put a crimp in consumer spending moving forward.

Hat tip: as always some of this is from Abnormal Returns. Even if not, go there.

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Research showing hope for stocks? Very questionable

Mark Hulbert reports on two indicators that historically have pointed towards above average returns for stocks:

The indicator in question focuses on corporate money-raising. Considerable research has shown that when companies turn aggressively to the equity market for their financing needs, through new issues or secondary offerings, it is a sign that the stock market is overvalued. Though there is no easy way to interpret the data, current trends in corporate finance appear no worse than neutral for the stock market’s intermediate-term prospects. And the data may actually be painting a bullish picture.

[...]

Professor Lamont, who is also a portfolio manager at DKR Capital, a hedge fund in Stamford, Conn., has calculated the new-list percentage back to 1929. Its all-time high was nearly 15 percent, at the beginning of the Depression. Its second-highest level, almost 11 percent, was in March 2000, just before the Internet bubble burst. (He published these results in 2002 in an academic working paper.)

This result doesn’t surprise me, and is intuitively reasonable. There is also this:

Two researchers who have studied these patterns are Malcolm P. Baker, a finance professor at Harvard Business School, and Jeffrey Wurgler, a finance professor at New York University. For each year from 1927 through 1996, the professors calculated the share of total capital raised by publicly traded corporations that came from issuing stock — what they call the equity share.

Over the 12 months after the quartile of years with the lowest equity shares (when this proportion was no higher than 14 percent) the stock market returned an average of 14 percent, according to the professors. In contrast, the market had an average net loss of 6 percent following the quartile of years with the highest equity shares (when this proportion was no lower than 27 percent). Their results were published in the October 2000 issue of the Journal of Finance.

This likewise makes sense that you would generally observe those conditions.

Where does the equity share stand now? In an e-mail message, Professor Wurgler said it was 6.1 percent for 2007 through September, the latest date for which data are available. Because this puts the current market solidly in the quartile of past years that were followed by above-average returns, he says the data are sending “a bullish stock market signal.”

So maybe I should be trading in my bearish hat over the next few years? I don’t think so:

In separate interviews, he and Professor Baker hastened to add that this bullish signal by no means justifies throwing caution to the wind. They pointed out that companies have had far easier access to cheap debt financing in recent years than they did in earlier decades. As a result, they argued, the current low equity share may not be strictly comparable with similarly low previous readings — and thus may not be as bullish as it otherwise would appear.

Throw in large cash reserves, record profit margins (which are reliably mean reverting) and companies hardly needed to issue equity. They already did that in extremes earlier. Much financial activity was diverted to private equity and M&A as well.

But judging from how companies have been raising new money, Professor Baker said, there was little evidence of extreme levels of speculation at the recent stock market high. At least to this extent, he said, this means that “there is less downside risk in the market today than there was in March 2000.”

Maybe so, though it seems a big risk one must account for in any decision on how to allocate assets. The problem, like with much finance theory, is that these are coincident indicators of the real problem, excessive speculation driving assets far above a reasonable estimate of their long term value. When stocks are overvalued companies do tend to issue equity, we see more companies going public, etc. However, they are not the actual driver of returns, and thus can give us a hint to check on whether the market is overvalued, but not whether it is.

Simply put, any reasonable assumption about growth in earnings, payout ratios and profit margins predicts low returns. Whether those low returns are fairly valued or not, there they are. If valuations decline to boot, we have a major decline in store.

I don’t believe investors realize how low the embedded returns in stocks are. Since I believe investors think that the US stock market can give them higher returns at these levels than is likely, when they are disappointed by declining profit margins and growth rates below their assumptions (combined with looking at their pathetic returns over the last 10 years) they will likely adjust the price. That adjustment could come fairly quickly (It would take a 30% or more drop from here just to get back to equities being priced to deliver real returns close to 5%) or by a combination of smaller declines and rallies going on for years, such as we have seen since 2002. That of course assumes inflation doesn’t become a larger issue (very much in doubt) and/or the pessimism doesn’t cause a large over shoot to the downside. When investors have been disappointed for a period of 10 years or more they have had a habit in the past of getting in very dark moods.

Hat tip: Abnormal Returns

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Martin Feldstein on the Economy, Credit Markets and Economic Risk

Martin Feldstein, stepping down from heading up the National Bureau of Economic Research since 1977, has piece in the Wall Street Journal that is rather pessimistic about the economic outlook. More tellingly he thinks the recession, if it occurs (and like me, he suspects it has already begun) will be more difficult to stimulate our way out of:

If a recession does occur, it could last longer and be more painful than the past several downturns because of differences in its origin and character. The recessions that began in 1991 and 2001 lasted only eight months from the start of the downturn until the beginning of the recovery. Even the deeper recession of 1981 lasted only 16 months.

But these past recessions were caused by deliberate Federal Reserve policy aimed at reversing a rise in inflation. In those cases, the Fed increased real interest rates until it saw the economic slowdown that it thought would move us back toward price stability. It then reversed course, reducing interest rates and bringing the recession to an end.

In contrast, the real interest rate in 2006 and 2007 stayed at a relatively low level of less than 3%. A key cause of the present slowdown and potential recession was not a tightening of monetary policy but the bursting of the house-price bubble after six years of exceptionally rapid house-price increases. The Fed therefore will not be able to end the recession as it did previous ones by turning off a tight monetary policy.

The unprecedented national fall in house prices is reducing household wealth and therefore consumer spending. House prices are down 10% from the 2006 high and are likely to fall at least another 10%. Each 10% decline cuts household wealth by about $2 trillion, and this eventually reduces annual consumer spending by about $100 billion. No one can predict the extent to which the coming fall in house prices will lead to defaults and foreclosures, driving house prices and wealth down even further. Falling house prices also discourage home building, with housing starts down 38% over the past 12 months.

But the principle cause for concern today is the paralysis of the credit markets. Credit is always key to the expansion of the economy. The collapse of confidence in credit markets is now preventing that necessary extension of credit. The decline of credit creation includes not only the banks but also the bond markets, hedge funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. Securitization, leveraged buyouts and credit insurance have also atrophied.

The dysfunctional character of the credit markets means that a Fed policy of reducing interest rates cannot be as effective in stimulating the economy as it has been in the past. Monetary policy may simply lack traction in the current credit environment.

Read the whole thing, but it mirrors much of what we have been saying. Here is Martin on the Charlie Rose show where he stresses that it is not just a subprime issue, that all kinds of assets were not priced appropriately, and frankly still are not:

Hat Tip: Barry Ritholtz

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Wesley Snipes has put tax protesters in the cross hairs of the IRS

Actor Wesley Snipes was found not guilty of federal tax fraud and conspiracy charges earlier this month. Basically he blamed it on the tax advice he received. Whether one believes that he didn’t know that when one earns $38 million you are likely to owe some tax, much less request a 12 million dollar refund, the decision has gotten the IRS to take the tax protester movement seriously:

Treasury and Justice Department officials say the protester ranks are growing and now include white-collar professionals. And they are costing the government millions of dollars.

“Too many people succumb to the fallacy, the illusion, that you don’t have to pay any tax under any set of conditions,” Assistant Attorney General Nathan Hochman told Bloomberg. “That is a growing problem.”

The movement has been energized by the Snipes trial:

According to the Bloomberg report, in addition to the Snipes verdict in which he was cleared of tax conspiracy charges, the tax protester movement has been given a boost by the faltering economy and politicians’ vilification of the Internal Revenue Service.

And, no surprise here, the promotion of “kooky” avoidance plans has been aided by the Internet, where many firms sell strategies online and believers encourage others to join the anti-tax efforts.

“Any kooky tax protester can put up their theories,” said Jonathan R. Siegel, a professor at George Washington University’s law school. “It is much easier to get their message before a mass audience.”

You can read the full Bloomberg story on the coming tax enforcement activities here.

You also should check out Siegel’s collection of tax protester myths here.

And the official U.S. word on such efforts can be found at this special Web page dedicated to debunking frivolous tax arguments.

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Jeremy Grantham in Favor Again

The Financial Times writes of his feeling of vindication.

Jeremy never falls out of favor here, but then, we are a client.

Inevitably when he is early, as he generally is, people take it as a sign he is wrong, and note the returns he gives up when he frequently goes against the tide. However, the true test of what makes one right is where an investor ends up at the end of the day, not right after breakfast. The same goes for other irritating party poopers (nobody minds when they are positive) such as John Hussman, Ed Easterling and Rob Arnott. Their outstanding results over time are enough for some, others not so much

Their clients are pretty happy with their outstanding long term results. Trailing some years by a small amount and then whomping most people when what they expect to happen comes true leads to some pretty compelling returns, both in relative and absolute terms.

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The key ingredient

Individuals who cannot master their emotions are ill-suited to profit from the investment process.

-Benjamin Graham

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Stimulating our Addiction

To spending rather than saving. From Atlas Blogged:

NYC Mayor Bloomberg on the federal economic stimulus plan:

They want to send out a check to everybody to stimulate the economy… I suppose it won’t hurt the economy, but it’s in many senses like giving a drink to an alcoholic.

Hey, hey, hey… alcohol a depressant. This is a stimulus! It’s completely different. Dumb***! (hic!)

By the way, Bloomberg was beat to the analogy by several weeks. TIME’s Michael Kinsley:

The experts caution that for maximum stimulus effect, we must be sure to spend it immediately. No squirreling it away for a rainy day. In drinking circles, they call this hair of the dog: to cure a hangover, you have another drink…

My gripe is that telling Americans they need to borrow and spend just a little bit more to get us past this recession—and then reform their ways—is like telling an alcoholic he needs one more drink before sobering up.

All we need is a “spending like a drunken sailor” comment and we’ll have this confusing stimulus-depressant-finances analogy wrapped up.

Well, that and a chaser.

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When to be confident

You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right.

-Benjamin Graham

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That Dangerous Reed

The four most dangerous words in investing are ‘This time it’s different.’-Sir John Templeton

Made more dangerous by the fact that occasionally, in some respects, it is. On that thin reed much damage has been done to investors.

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Todays Links: Big Picture Day

Bad news for the monolines. FGIC just got downgraded today to AA. That pretty much puts them out of the business of insuring municipal bonds.

NYS Commissioner of Insurance has suggested splitting the Muni bond business from the rest of the insurers. FGIC seems to now think that isn’t a bad idea. Of course, since Elliot Spitzer has told them all to find sufficient capital in the next three to five days, they may have little choice.

Barry Ritholtz thinks this pretty much will lead to ending them as viable organizations:

What’s left is can best be described as a poorly run, derivative hedge fund led by people who have no business running a hedge fund of any sort, much less one of the poorly run derivative variety. But the fact that the NYS insurance commissioner is suggesting this should tell you that this has reached a level of government involvement that cannot bode well for our friends at ABK, MBIA and FGIC

Those vaunted rate cuts which Risk and Return was skeptical would be the driving force behind our economic path?

The Federal Reserve’s interest-rate cuts last month have failed to lower borrowing costs for many companies and households, increasing the chance of further reductions from the central bank.

Companies are paying more to borrow now than before the Fed reduced its benchmark rate by 1.25 percentage point over nine days in January, based on data compiled by Merrill Lynch & Co. Rates on so-called jumbo mortgages, those above $417,000, have increased in the past month, making it tougher to sell properties and risking further price declines.

Barry again:

Bill King noted a similar story on ABC News:

[Monday] night, the lead story on ABC evening news (World News) was ‘though the Fed has cut interest rates sharply in recent weeks, banks and credit card companies are hiking rates on consumers.’

Chase, Bank One and Bank of American were cited. The ABC News reporter said banks are hiking consumer interest rates and fees to cover losses on their crappy paper.

Yes, it’s that blatant and transparent.

Lovely. We get all of the wonderful inflationary effects of rate cuts — but none of the economic benefits.

Can you say “The Fed is pushing on a string?”
(Very good children. I knew you could)

True, though my own opinion is the Fed never has as much strength to push as we think they do. Way too much time is spent on what the Fed is doing. Granted, even though I know better, I do it as well.

While I keep sending you to Barry today, you might as well let him educate you on why the retail sales number that cheered some for a moment on Wall Street are actually looking pretty disastrous. Start here, finish there.

Hat tip: As always, some of this is from Abnormal Returns. Even if not, go there.

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