Ten Lessons Not Learnt

Occasionally you read something that makes you go “WOW!” Jeremy Grantham in at least half of his Quarterly Letters comes close. The other half of the time he definitely scores.

Another person who generally has the same effect, and like Jeremy was a true hero to clients who really listened over the last decade, is James Montier. First at Dresdner Kleinwort, and then Société Générale (with another gem, his colleague Albert Edwards) James expounded on value investing, behavioral finance and the perils of modern finance. Not that the bankers of Société Générale listened.

In a career move that makes perfect sense James has now joined Jeremy at GMO. With James and Ben Inker the GMO team will deserve respect long after Jeremy is gone.

Which gets me back to WoW!

James has produced an analysis of the crisis and its aftermath that is close to perfect. Not only are the ten points and his discussion enlightening in and of themselves, but the wisdom of other great investors is liberally sprinkled throughout. This is one of those pieces that says exactly what I think about a host of issues, but better. Here are a few highlights:

Lesson 1: Markets aren’t efficient.

One would think this would be obvious by now, but no, it isn’t to many.

Lesson 2: Relative performance is a dangerous game.

Personally I believe that it is to the benefit of those of us who refuse to play the relative performance game, but managers, consultants and the industry in general conspire against looking at things differently.

On the subject of the industries obsession with deciding how to categorize returns as alpha or beta or any number of ever finer benchmarks:

Sadly, these concepts are nothing more than a distraction from the true aim of investment, which as the late, great Sir John Templeton observed is, “Maximum total real returns after tax.”

Such a simplistic mind you have James worrying about what ends up in the bank account rather than beating a benchmark or proving your results are “alpha” rather than beta.

It is also nice to see James noticing studies which show managers can beat an index, they bizarrely choose not to. Go figure.

Lesson 3: The time is never different.

We better hope it is this time, because the history of collapsing credit bubbles certainly argues for several years of economic distress.

Lesson 4: Valuation matters.

Ultimately nothing has a greater impact on returns in the stock market than the price you pay. This is consistently denigrated but consistently proves true over time:

Graham and Dodd PE basket

Oh, and in case you were wondering, we presently reside on the expensive end of that chart.

Lesson 5: Wait for the fat pitch.

The problem with this is that investors are impatient:

As tempting as it may be to be a “man of action,” it often makes more sense to act only at extremes. But the discipline required to “do nothing” for long periods of time is not often seen. As noted above, overt myopia also contributes to our inability to sit back, trying to understand the overall investment backdrop.

Waiting for the “fat pitch” as Warren Buffett calls it requires one to realize:

  1. cash is a position
  2. that it is okay not to do as well as everyone else while waiting for the right opportunity
  3. the necessity of investing in opportunities not dependent on the stock markets direction
  4. that you should respect dividends
  5. you need to act when everyone else is in a state of panic
  6. that it is only useful to panic if you do so before everyone else!

Warren Buffett often speaks of the importance of waiting for the fat pitch – that perfect moment when patience is rewarded as the ball meets the sweet spot. However, most investors seem unable to wait, forcing themselves into action at every available opportunity, swinging at every pitch, as it were.

Lesson 6: Sentiment matters.

The more enthusiastic investors are, the more cautious you should be, and vice versa.

Lesson 7: Leverage can’t make a bad investment good, but it can make a good investment bad!

In and of itself modest leverage can help a good investment, but only if you can live with the volatility long enough for the good investment to pay off. Excessive leverage destroys the ability to hold.

Lesson 8: Over-quantification hides real risk.

James quotes the great Ben Graham:

Mathematics is ordinarily considered as producing precise and dependable results; but in the stock market the more elaborate and abstruse the mathematics the more uncertain and speculative are the conclusions we draw there from … Whenever calculus is brought in, or higher algebra, you could take it as a warning that the operator was trying to substitute theory for experience, and usually also to give to speculation the deceptive guise of investment.

This lesson especially appeals to me. As a long time fan of the “Its Bigger Than a Bread Box” school of investing I cannot agree more with the false sense of certainty and its dangers in applied investing. What I mean by “bigger than a bread box” goes back to lesson 6 and it paying most to act at extremes. Precision is not only unattainable then, but irrelevant. Look for something so important that getting it exactly right isn’t important. Everything else will likely amount to no more than short term noise.

I remember an investment committee meeting in early 2008 as the downturn we had been preparing for was in its early innings. The debate was going back and forth over how bad things might get. I decide it was time to cut to the chase:

Debating how bad things might get is like arguing after you have fallen off a building whether it is a 30 or 60 story fall. Either way you are dead. The real solution is the same either way, don’t fall off the damn building!

We moved on to how we should protect our capital and hopefully even profit from the coming collapse.

Here is another gem from James on how trying to mathematically calculate risk distracts us from what really matters:

In a depressing parody of the “build it and they will come” mentality, the risk management industry seems to believe “measure it, and it must be useful.” In investing, all too often risk is equated with volatility. This is nonsense. Risk isn’t volatility, it is the permanent loss of capital. Volatility creates opportunity. As Keynes noted, “It is largely fluctuations which throw up the bargains and the uncertainty due to fluctuations which prevents other people from taking advantage of them.”

We would be far better off if we abandoned our obsession with measurement in favor of understanding a trinity of risks. From an investment point of view, there are three main paths to the permanent loss of capital: valuation risk (buying an overvalued asset), business risk (fundamental problems), and financing risk (leverage). By understanding these three elements, we should get a much better understanding of the true nature of risk.

Interestingly, it is valuation risk which has proved hardest to avoid, and causes the most lasting damage to investors portfolios.

Lesson 9: Macro matters.

Big macro economic events can destroy what seems normal when it comes to valuation. The big risks need to be accounted for, even when they seem unlikely (bonus wisdom from the great Jean Marie Eveillard:

It often pays to remember the wise words of Jean-Marie Eveillard. “Sometimes, what matters is not so much how low the odds are that circumstances would turn quite negative, what matters more is what the consequences would be if that happens.” In terms of finance jargon, expected payoff has two components: expected return and probability. While the probability may be small, a truly appalling expected return can still result in a negative payoff.

[...]

Neither top-down nor bottom-up has a monopoly on insight. We should learn to integrate their dual perspectives.

Lesson 10: Look for sources of cheap insurance.

If low probability but disastrous events need to be accounted for, then finding ways to cheaply mitigate, or even profit from, them is important. Even if it is in the short term a drag on performance. Quality balance sheets in your stock holdings are cheap insurance right now, so are other strategies. We are closely looking at where cheap insurance can be found.

Read Ten Lessons Not learnt

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On the heels of last weeks delightfully mixed bag of employment data (job creation looks like it may be out of reverse and into neutral) we get some new housing data. There the signals are more disquieting, if expected (at least by me.) The housing market may now be heading back down.

The interesting aspect of this is that so many people see this as unlikely. So let us list some reasons why this is a real risk, if probably not as rapid a fall as we saw previously.

  • Prices are still above a long term stable level. This could be taken care of by stagnating prices and inflation, but there is little inflation right now.
  • The price to rent ratio is out of whack, and rents are still falling, in fact, accelerating. Little wonder, since there is an 11% vacancy rate.
  • офис столове

Source: Gary Shilling

  • There are 231,000 newly built housing units sitting vacant.
  • There are 3.29 million vacant homes for sale.
  • Then there is the shadow inventory of homes that are off the market for various reasons (such as foreclosed homes banks are unwilling to sell yet to avoid realizing losses.)
  • Defaults are accelerating, with the largest source of pain now prime loans. As I have maintained for a long time this is not, and never has been, a subprime problem. Subprime was just what collapsed first being the weakest link in the housing market.

Source: Gary Shilling

  • That acceleration is unlikely to slow any time soon as not only are workers still losing jobs and few new potential owners getting jobs, but the length of unemployment is unprecedented in the post war era. The longer a worker is unemployed, the more likely they are to default.

Source: Gary Shilling

  • Lending is still tight for many mortgage seekers.
  • We are forming households at a reduced rate, thus lessening demand for new homes.

Source: Gary Shilling

  • More than 20% of homeowners are currently underwater. Nothing correlates more closely with default rates than negative equity.
  • Worst of all, we need to revisit an old topic of mine that is no longer a longer term risk, but right around the corner. The likely huge wave of defaults represented by Alt-A and Option Arm Loans about to reset. Defaults have followed with a lag each wave of resets, and the largest wave, from the era with the worst underwriting is about to hit. Notice, subprime is receding. With the system as fragile as it is now, what will this wave bring on?

I always am nervous about calling anything a prediction, but further housing deterioration is a very grave possibility.

Needless to say, this has led to further problems at Fannie, Freddie with more to come. Not that you should be concerned about that, the mission has changed. On their way to probably 400 billion in losses (I remember when I was an alarmist claiming that the losses would be far more than the 20-30 million the government was claiming, probably 200 billion. It turns out I was a cockeyed optimist) the government has officially eliminated any limit on their exposure. Why? It seems to be so that they can take losses!

Freddie’s federal overseers nevertheless have instructed Mr. Haldeman to focus on something that isn’t likely to make the bleak balance sheet look any better: carrying out the Obama administration plan to allow defaulted borrowers to hang onto their homes.

On a recent afternoon, employees at Freddie’s headquarters here peppered Mr. Haldeman with concerns about the company’s future. He responded that they were “fortunate” to have such a clear mission—the government’s foreclosure-prevention drive. “We’re doing what’s best for the country,” he told them.

Then there is the poor FHA:

FT Alphaville is certainly in the skeptical camp referred to by Ms Burns, and we were not reassured when the housing agency released its December monthly report on Tuesday.

According to the report, the default rate in the FHA’s single-family portfolio hit 9.12 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009, compared with 6.82 per cent in the same period a year prior.

In absolute terms, that means the number single-family mortgages insured by the FHA and in default reached 531,671 in the fourth quarter of 2009. That’s a 66 per cent increase versus the same period in 2008.

The agency is being hit hardest by the 2007 and 2008 mortgage vintages; the performance of these loans is so dismal the FHA expects to have to pay claims on at least one out of every four loans made in those years.

Cross Posted at: The View from the Bluff

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Musings, Rants and Links over the 18th Fairway:02/08/2010

We finally got a mixed bag on the employment front this month, a welcome change from the purely awful. However, with everyone focused on “creating” jobs I think this quick synopsis attacking the unrealistic expectations of when and where jobs will come from is well worth reading. This chart gives you an idea of how bad it really has been (click image for larger version)

PercentJobLossesJan2010

Yves Smith looks at the problem of how to handle the prospect of the financially weaker members of the European Union possibly defaulting. neither the PIIGS nor their colleague states want to take the steps they may need to take. Markets however are sending a clear message, “Do Something!” The risk goes beyond the direct damage from the potential losses from holding these countries debts. European banks are already shaky, with shaky assets and still a lot more leverage than is safe. I believe Europe’s bear market is likely back on.

European banks are shaky? How provincial of me not to mention our own banks. The coming wave of defaults in the Alt-A and Prime mortgage space are not getting enough attention, Yves helps out there as well. Not only are the losses coming (pretending loans are good only works until they actually default) but the banks are in for some serious lawsuits from all kinds of parties that bought the toxic loans. First in line are Freddie and Fannie. They will still lose at least 400 billion, but they’ll take a good chunk out of the banks hide on the way down.

the phrase “credit specialists at Citi” is not exactly the kind of thing which instills enormous confidence in analysts and investors these days

I think that is an understatement. They want to sell another fancy derivative designed to remove all risk if there is a systemic crisis when, of course, those supposed to pay up will certainly have the money to do so….Right?

Please imagine me banging my head against the keyboard. And no, the response of the Citi Spokesman doesn’t make me feel any different, in fact, it makes me feel worse.

The term liquidity is the pixie dust the financial commentariat uses to obscure what is really going on. I maintain, and have throughout the last few years, that our difficulties have not been a liquidity crisis (though many who had no business exposing themselves individually to liquidity drying up for them certain had a liquidity crisis) but a solvency crisis. David Merkel points out that liquidity always exists, it just goes where the marginal credit buyer  has gone. Where insolvency risk seems to be increasing, the marginal buyer can become very scarce and will provide it to areas seemingly exposed to less risk. At the end of the day it is solvency that is our problem, and until we solve that liquidity will go to those perceived to be least at risk. Right now that is the government and those they are backing.   Hence a credit crunch for much of the economy.

Speaking of credit, consumer credit has now declined for 11 straight months. A record, and by a long shot. (Click image for a larger version.)

ConsumerCreditDec2009

In the “no big surprise department,” and paralleling the argument I made at the time, it has now been shown that the ban on short selling during the crisis did not help support prices and damaged stock market liquidity. In the no surprise at all department the biggest complainers turned out to have fundamental problems that short sellers were pointing out accurately (much better than our regulators.) The loudest complainer of all, Overstock.com and their bizarre CEO, Patrick Byrne. The upshot, they have been cooking their books for years, just like the short sellers were claiming.

Cross posted at The View from the Bluff

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Animated Unemployment

A very cool animated Graphic showing the change in unemployment over the last two years.

Click Image for Animation

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Taking a Closer Look at Unemployment

Employment as measured by the “establishment survey,” was down by 190,000; and Many feel it is an improvement that we are not falling as fast.

Well, let us take a moment to look under the hood of these numbers. First, while the establishment survey was down 190k, the number of unemployed soared by 558,000, to 15.7 million, as measured by the household survey. The establishment survey is taken from large businesses while the household survey calls individual households. It is the household survey that sets the unemployment rate. The establishment survey of companies doesn’t count the self-employed and undercounts employees of small businesses. So the economic picture is probably worse than the headlines when it comes to jobs.

Continue Reading »

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Fat Pitches and the Carry Trade

At the end of last year, my opinion was the fattest pitch in investing over the near term was convertible arbitrage. The downside seemed very limited, the upside large and unlikely to correlate with the market. Well, it did correlate with the market, at least once the market turned. In essence everything did. Before that, it did pretty well on the downside so I got that part right.

Jake at Econompic gives us this chart, which shows that convertible arbitrage has indeed led the way this year:

Unfortunately, he has a fine post, which shows the dark side of this rally and the “carry trade” which has been helping finance it:

if the correlation of assets purchased is near one on the way up, it is sure as hell going to be that high or higher on the way down. And what happens to all these investors that are attempting to leave the same exit door at the same time? Massive re-purchasing of the dollar and massive selling of any risk asset… joy.

Joy indeed.

Cross posted at “The View From the Bluff.”

Economists Monkeying Around

What can we learn from monkeys about economics? It seems monkeys value skills, at least those in scarce supply.

Testing on the Great Economists

A little fun. Robert Whaples, an economics professor, has posted a short timed quiz on the contributions of great economists. Okay, maybe only fun for geeks such as myself. I missed the last question, and frankly don’t know a lot about that economists actual work, though I am familiar with his overall view of things and read some of his stuff. Everybody else was pretty much obvious, or at least to a geek like myself. Have fun!

Adam Smith

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A Roll of the Dice

Emma James of the Baton Rouge Business Report interviews myself, Mike Patton of Integrity Wealth Management (a pretty good egg from what I know of him) and Professor Kelley Pace of LSU on the subject of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT’s.) I think she does a pretty good job on what is in fact a very complex issue at the moment.

On a longer term basis public REITs are reasonably valued, and the very possible collapse in the Commercial Real Estate market will give public REITs with their more flexible capital structures the ability to buy some very attractive property at distressed prices. However, they will likely be under tremendous pressure in the shorter run, and the overall market environment is likely to be unkind as well. Which means we may get a chance to buy them at a much cheaper price down the road, with the opportunity for them to profit from the distressed property market still in front of us. It may seem a bit like dancing on gravestones, but I would welcome it.

Unlike 2006-2008 I am not of a mind to go “short” publicly traded REITs however, as reasonable long term valuations make that potential decline far from a given.

Posted via web from Risk and Return’s Posterous

More “Money on the Sidelines” Nonsense

Barry Ritholtz jumps on one of my pet peeves, the whole “gobs of money on the sidelines” scam (silliness, nonsense or delusion work also) which constantly crops up in financial commentary.

Folks, don’t fall for it. The stock market may rise or fall in coming months but “money on the sidelines” will not have anything to do with it. Barry resurrects an old John Hussman piece which is one of my favorite dissections of this myth:

I’ve said this before, but it’s important. If Ricky sells his money market shares and buys stocks, then his money market fund has to sell commercial paper to Nicky, whose currency goes to Ricky, who uses it to pay for the stock bought from Mickey. In the end, the currency that Nicky held is now held by Mickey, the commercial paper held by Ricky is now held by Nicky, and the stock held by Mickey is now held by Ricky, and there is exactly as much stock, commercial paper, and currency outstanding as there was before. All that happened is that the owner of each security has changed.

I suggest reading the whole thing, but if ordinary logic doesn’t prove it then maybe actual facts about the behavior of markets will help, also courtesy of Barry:

Notice, when the market was rising so was cash. It didn’t disappear into the stock market and explain the rising market. In fact, during the tech crash it declined along with the market. Before the most recent market crash this argument “cash on the sidelines” was used to argue why the stock market wouldn’t decline. How did that work out?

Amusingly (if somewhat darkly so) Hussman in the piece above wrote in 2006 how the fallacy might mislead us:

There is an important reason for these considerations here. As I’ve noted in recent months, it’s likely that China and Japan will at least stabilize in their willingness to absorb the flood of government liabilities that they’ve been snapping up in recent years. That means that more of these liabilities will be forced into the hands of U.S. investors. As that happens, we’re likely to observe an accumulation of “cash on the sidelines” that might look like a hopeful sign for stocks.

A hopeful sign that left investors holding the bag. Don’t believe it this time or next time.

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The Bailout May Need a Bailout

Our government is now on the hook for trillions in mortgage loans, and traders are making money selling them more debt. The problem is that the bailout just may be suffering losses that are leaving our government scrambling to shuffle the pea from cup to cup. From Heidi Moore:

Look deeper, however, and the government isn’t really quitting its bailouts at all. It is just shifting strategy away from banks and financial services to a new set of quieter bailouts, centered on the housing and real estate markets in general and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in particular. In this way, the administration’s actions are meshing with the wishes of House financial services committee Chairman Barney Frank, who said last year, “I want at least two years with President Obama and a solidly Democratic Senate so that we can get the federal government back in the housing business.” Now it is, even to the point that the government is at risk of creating another mortgage bubble. We just have to see if the government can handle it.

The government has to concentrate all of its resources on keeping the housing and real estate markets stable because the government is now the single biggest investor in mortgage-backed securities. It bought more than 80 percent of all the mortgages issued by Fannie and Freddie. What this means is that if homeowners start to fall behind on those mortgages in even bigger numbers than the current 9.24 percent default rate, the government is in deep trouble, starting with the Federal Reserve. The Fed’s own balance sheet—its financial holdings—has ballooned to $2.1 trillion from just $800 billion a year ago. One-third of the Fed’s balance sheet is weighed down with $625 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities, once floating around the market and now invited to stay in Uncle Sam’s own accounts.

Read the whole thing.

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How Bad is the Employment Picture?

From the New York Times: U.S. Job Seekers Exceed Openings by Record Ratio

Hat tip: The Big Picture

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Whither Inflation?

American Public Media’s Paddy Hirsch does a good job of breaking down the deflation and inflation risks we are facing. I think he ends up discussing the likely outcome. Deflation, or at least very low inflation, for the next 2-3 years followed by accelerating inflationary pressures for the next 5-7 years.

Inflation from Marketplace on Vimeo.

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The Debt Mountain

The problem ultimately from an economic point of view is the mountain of debt. Short term it may be argued, and I say that with caution, that keeping debt from falling is what we needed to do to give us time to work it down in an orderly manner.

However, working that mountain of debt down needs to be done and will be a large drag for years. Hat tip: Clusterstock

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Stephen Roach on Green Shoots: “get a new metaphor”

Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, lets CNBC know something many seem to be missing, the financial crisis is not over.

Green Shoots and Brown Weeds

We conducted our first webcast last week, an update on the housing market, unemployment and the economy. We had a couple of technical issues which were a bit distracting, and we need a new microphone, but all in all a fair overview of the economy which was well received by those who attended. The webcast can be viewed at our new YouTube page.

Here is part I:

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Bennet Sedacca RIP

I just saw this and am very distressed. Bennet has been a ray of light in a world filled with people trying to obscure the truth. His passing is a sad moment.

For some of the best and most insightful financial writing around I recommend combing through his archives. I occasionally do. Revisiting past musings of the greats may not be as immediately useful as some things, but longer term it allows a perspective that will serve you well over time. distributed raman amplifier

A Brilliant Couplet

One need not share Arnold Klings view on the particular issue. However, I think one must appreciate the cleverness of his rhetoric.

One view of the Japanese stimulus (or multiple stimuli) is that it (they) failed because it was (they were) too small. Just as the reason that in World War I all British attacks prior to the Battle of the Somme failed was because they were too small.

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The Stanford Group Fraud

I have had a problem with the  Stanford Group, and the “CD’s” they were pushing, for several years now. No need to explain why at this point. Anyway, this has hit Baton Rouge extremely hard. I don’t believe in relative terms (outside of Antigua itself) any other community had a larger exposure to Stanford than Baton Rouge.

Therefore it is no surprise that it is a larger story in Baton Rouge than elsewhere. Anyway, The Baton Rouge Business Report’s (as fine a local business publication as there is in the United States) Olivia Watkins interviewed me on how those of us in the industry viewed the impact and fallout from this. It was a long discussion, but some of my thoughts on how this kind of thing has played out in the past made it into this story.

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A Painful Restructuring

An excellent overview of the dramatic restructuring of the US economy at the NY Times.

Click for larger version of charts.
Job Gains and Losses

The Labor Picture in February

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